Trust and trustworthiness are two factors in alliances that
are also factors in game theory. The definition of trust in an alliance is “mutual
confidence that no party to an exchange will exploit another’s vulnerabilities”
(Barney & Hansen, 1994, p.3). Barney
& Hansen (1994) also describe three different types of trust that can shape
an alliance and determine its success. The same definition of trust can be
applied to game theory, specifically to the prisoner’s dilemma which was first
explored by mathematician Albert Tucker in the 1950’s (Darity, 2008).
The prisoner’s dilemma is a hypothetical situation in where
two people are arrested for a crime. After being arrested, the two people are
then separated into different rooms and interrogated. The police suspect the
two suspects collaborated on the crime. The suspects have some choices, they
can remain silent (cooperate) or confess (defect). If both stay silent, the police cannot
convict either suspect. If one defects
and tells the police what happened, that suspect will have a lesser sentence
while the other will have a more severe one.
If both suspects confess, their sentences will not be as severe as if
just one of them confessed, but is still more severe than if both had remained
silent. A hypothetical payoff matrix
from Banerjee (2005) is pasted below to summarize the various options.
Here's a link to a Dilbert video that explains the prisoner's dilemma:
The payoff matrix in game theory can be compared to semi-strong
trust and strong form trust with alliances; the same external factors as well
as morals apply to the prisoner’s dilemma. The governance or external laws and
regulations that impose penalties on opportunistic behavior that exist with
alliances (semi-strong trust) also exist in the prisoner’s dilemma (Barney
& Hansen, 1994). In the prisoner’s dilemma, it can be assumed that both
suspects are rational and want to minimize their prison sentence. This is a form of governance that punishes
someone for taking advantage of another’s vulnerabilities. If the two suspects
also know one another or are related, you can assume that they have some morals
and would feel guilty or immoral if they told on the other one and left them
with a longer prison sentence, which is an example of strong form trust in
alliances (Barney & Hansen, 1994).
There are additional factors that can impact how a person
makes a decision in the prisoner’s dilemma, such as repeated play or
interaction. If the one suspect will interact with the other suspect in the
future or if the two have a broader strategy, then one is probably not going to
confess and leave the other behind. This same factor can impact alliances. If
one organization enters into an alliance as part of a broader strategic goal,
then the organization will not be as likely to expose the other’s
vulnerabilities and will put more effort into making the relationship
successful (Kanter, 2010).
Game theory and alliances are both about protecting your own
vulnerabilities and trying to maximize on benefits. Trust and payoff evaluation are two key
factors that are seriously evaluated by the individuals or organizations considering
entering into an alliance with another organization, and are also two key
factors evaluated in game theory.
References
Banerjee, A. (2005). A dynamic game-theoretic approach to
the modified prisoner’s dilemma. Oxford University Press, 493-502. doi:10.1093/jigpal/jzi037Barney, J. & Hansen, M. (1994). Trustworthiness as a source of competitive advantage. Strategic Management Journal, 15, 175-190.
Darity, W. A. (2008). In International encyclopedia of the
social sciences (2nd ed). Detroit, MI: Macmillian Reference USA
Gomes – Casseres, B. (1993). Managing international alliances:
A conceptual framework. Harvard Business
School, 1-20. Ishiyama, J.T. (2011). In 21st century political science: A reference handbook. (2011 Ed).
Kanter, R. (2010). Collaborative advantage: The art of
alliances. Harvard Business Review.
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Hi Melanie.. my brain is a mostly dead after the CMGT 540 SPSS torture chamber but here it goes:
ReplyDeleteI liked the analogy between game theory and the decisions companies must come to if they want to merge or collaborate.
I imagine though, the payoff in game theory is much more immediate and personal in that you know the consequences of your actions quickly as do the people in your matrix. Corporations though, it could take years to see such consequences of a merger and by then there may have been turnover of the executives who made the key decisions.
I wonder how the immediacy and the personal nature of the game theory vs. the time lag and not as personal nature of the corporate alliances affect the thinking of the people in both matrices. Hope that makes sense!!
Hi John,
ReplyDeleteYes, that does make sense. I think time does play a factor in alliances, but think companies should still think about the impacts as if they were immediate. By thinking about impacts as long-term, a company might give their partner the benefit of the doubt and think they'll prove themselves over time. If the relationshp doesn't work out, the results are the same whether the alliance lasted one day (as with game theory) or one year. Often the impacts over a longer period of time are worse because one organization opens up more and begins to trus the other.
Melanie--game theory and alliances--excellent connection! I have an exercise that I do with students using game theory. Even when the payoff is explicitly slanted toward collaboration and trust, students will most often look for the easy score. Checks and balances are critical for examining the value of any relationship.
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