Space: The Great Unknown - Mystery vs. Puzzles

When faced with a tragedy like losing the Space Shuttle Columbia, or the Challenger before it, people immediately want to piece together the puzzle to solve the mystery as to what went wrong.  Communications majors theorize what broke down within hierarchies of communication or missing information, or even a tough culture within a company that yields certain behaviors which might have jeopardized the space missions (Harris, Jr., 1995; Ferraris & Carveth, 2003). NASA followed several physical and analytical theories while the Columbia Accident Investigation Board conducted their extensive study (CAIB, 2003). People tend to explain to what they know (Harris, Jr., 1995).

Having a friend that has worked in aeronautics at NASA since 2003 (shortly following the Columbia disaster), I thought this was a fantastic opportunity to gain the insider advantage to see if my group were on the right track with our communication-related theories or if he could provide additional insight as to other potential contributing issues.  What I got was an introduction to the aeronautic industry, their culture, risk management, and a new perspective for solving the puzzles of these tragedies. Instead of simply printing the interview and subsequent discussion, I will present a few larger theories I focused on as a result of conversations with him about the Columbia mission and about NASA.

TRUE DANGER:

The CAIB sheds clear light on the fact that space travel, though many decades old, is still truly very new compared to commercial flying that we frequent. My friend detailed NASA’s risk matrixes explaining how they continually work to lower severity or probability of any issues occurring. My friend also referred to an article by Malcolm Gladwell that reports on mystery vs. puzzles.  NASA, he pointed out, is a data-loving group. Any new system or direction must be supported by the proper research to complete the puzzle.  Likewise, it suggests while the world works to make sense of the scattered pieces of the puzzle and to find the root of the problem to prevent it next time, there is a certain area that falls into the mysterious unknown or where the probability of something is so very slim that it does not register as significant, but it doesn’t erase it completely.  The press tends to ignore that area and draws conclusions based on what they do know. The CAIB report points out that 2-5% of the time, rockets fail. My friend pointed out that the statistic holds true when considering NASA’s shuttle disasters but, of course, the loss of human life from the shuttle disasters makes the tragedy hit home and feel that much larger for people in general. However there is more danger when the media who isn’t educated in the field tries to speak on the industry’s behalf.

CONTEXT IS KEY:

When I presented my group theories of Groupthink to my friend, his response was that context is key.  The reporters and researchers that emerged in the wake of the disaster searched for the pieces of the puzzle, found and interpreted information and drew conclusions based on what they found without knowing the larger picture or context for what they found.  For example, there were emails of foam-caused damage to the shuttle and of worst case scenarios and questions of why weren’t people warned or why this mission was then allowed to proceed (Glanz & Wong, 2003). The reason why my friend recalls this is for his job, he sends multiple emails regularly answering co-workers’ inquiries as to certain scenarios and worst-case scenarios as a part of the risk assessment for projects. He proposed that perhaps my previous perspective defining certain behavior as “arrogance” could simply be “Acceptance of the above-mentioned risks” and that 98% of the time, the group leading the mission is applauded for passionately and boldly leading astronauts to space and back, but the 2% transforms their behavior into arrogance.

WEB OF KNOWLEDGE:

NASA is filled with people at the top of their field.  Some people know a little bit about the expansive industry as a whole, some become experts in their individual role – for example, rocket design.  Based on the risk matrix they know what the true issues are, just as a surgeon knows what is really at stake should you go under the knife at their hands.  Would you want your doctor to tell you every little single possible thing that could go wrong or trust that the doctor is educated enough to prevent 98% of the risks?  I’m not saying that astronauts aren’t told the risks, I’m saying that if something went wrong, I wouldn’t go to the doctor and assume that I knew better than they did without the same education or, even if I was also the same sort of doctor, being in the middle of the situation with them. The same should be said about the sequences that occurred resulting in the shuttle tragedies.

While I went into this project planning to learn more about Groupthink, I instead emerged with a better respect for the subjects being researched and the responsibility of the person conducting the research.  My friend summed up an interesting thought that will make me a more thorough researcher in the future.  “Arrogance isn’t with the astronaut [or mission leaders] but with the person who comes in after and thinks their studies say enough to make them expert to speak on what happened.”

Sarah Harris

CMGT 500

Week 10 Application

References

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report (2003, August). [website] Retrieved from

     http://caib.nasa.gov/news/report/volume1/chapters.html

Ferraris, C. & Carveth, R. (2003). NASA and the Columbia Disaster: Decision-making by

     Groupthink? Proceedings of the 2003 Association for Business Communication Annual

     Convention. Retrieved from http://businesscommunication.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04

     /03ABC03.pdf

Gladwell, M. (2007, Jan 08). Open secrets; dept. of public policy. The New Yorker, 82, 44-

     53. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/233141921?accountid=14749

Glanz J., & Wong, E. (2003, February 4).  Engineer’s ’97 report warned of damage to tiles by

     foam.  Retrieved on June 8, 2003 from www.nytimes.com/2003/02/04/national/04WRON

Harris, C.E., Jr. (1995). Explaining Disasters, the case for preventative ethics. Technology and

     Society Magazine, IEEE 14(2), 22-27. DOI: 10.1109/44.393043